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Bethesda, Maryland
ABSTRACT
The problems faced by early planners of U.S. 
space boosters up to Saturn are described 
beginning with early space flight proposals, 
extending through the golden age of rocket 
technology during the 1950s, and following 
the reactions to Soviet space accomplish- 
ments. The problems a mixture of sorting 
out futuristic conceptions, settling differ- 
ences over what was technically feasible, 
and gaining political and public acceptance- 
could have their counterparts today.
INTRODUCTION
The solutions to problems of space trans- 
portation depend now, as in the past, on a 
melding of what is desired with what is 
technically feasible and what is econom- 
ically and politically acceptable. In this 
paper, past problems and some solutions in 
space transportation will be discussed by 
recounting some selected activities up 
through the 1950s.(1^
That space transportation is desirable and
feasible has been proclaimed for a long 
time. Indeed, it is inseparable from any 
manned space flight proposal, of which there 
were many prior to World War II ranging from
the frivolous to scientific analyses. The 
first of the scientific was a paper by 
Tsiolkovskiy who in 1903 developed the
theory of rocket flight and described a 
manned rocket using liquid hydrogen-oxygen. 
He was followed by Goddard, who combined 
theory with experiment; by Oberth, who ex- 
panded rocket theory and suggested inno- 
vations used today; and by Valier, who was 
prolific in ideas for peaceful space explo- 
ration. In the late 1920s and early 1930s, 
Valier and Tsiolkovskiy independently began 
developing the thesis that the way to the 
stars was the gradual increase in the capa- 
bility of the airplane from atmospheric to 
interplanetary flight. There was, however,
little attention given to the return trip 
until the papers of Sanger and Bredt who 
discussed hypervelocity winged vehicles 
that returned to earth by skip-glide paths. (2)
SPACE ACTIVITIES AND ATTITUDES, 1945-49
Although Goddard flew the first liquid 
propellant rocket in 1926, the practical- 
ity and potential of liquid rockets was not 
convincingly demonstrated until the mass 
produced German war weapon, the A-4. The 
"A 11 series plan extended to A-9, a winged 
vehicle for increasing range by a skip- 
glide path. In 1945, the A-4's chief engi- 
neer, Wernher von Braun, excited the imag- 
ination of many with his views on future 
space possibilities including multi-stage 
piloted vehicles orbiting the earth. 'He 
was the first to speak of practical space 
flight from a position of recognized and 
impressive rocket accomplishments but even 
so, acceptance was limited. The future of 
rockets beyond A-4 capability received a 
mixed reception among U.S. Government offi- 
cials in 1945-46. At one extreme was the 
optimism of forward-looking Gen. H 0 H.Arnold, 
chief of the Army Air Forces who, with the 
advice of a group of aeronautical experts 
headed by TTieodore von Karman, forecast that 
strategic bombers would eventually be re- 
placed by long-range ballistic missiles; at 
the other extreme was the pessimism of con- 
servative, highly respected Dr. Vannevar 
Bush, head of the Office of Scientific 
Research and Development, and Dr. Jerome 
Hunsaker, chairman of the National Advisory 
Committee for Aeronautics (NACA)., both of 
whom saw long-range rocket missiles as ,^ 
impossible for many years to come, at best." 
One of 'the chief reasons for such pessimism, 
was the values of the exhaust velocity and 
the ratio of full to empty mass of the A-4. 
Anyone familiar with the Tsiolkovskiy
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equation which relates these to vehicle 
velocity could see that appreciable improve- 
ments in both would be necessary to increase 
its range, and these improvements appeared 
hard to achieve. Space enthusiasts might 
brush such problems aside but the key people 
controlling government purse strings re- 
mained unconvinced. In this kind of envi- 
ronment, rocket research and development 
proceeded at a relatively slow pace. The 
Army showed the most initiative in ballistic 
missiles and organized a strong team headed 
by von Braun. Mid-level Navy men started a 
project for a satellite to be boosted into 
orbit by a single stage using hycjrogen- 
oxygen but it never received strong support 
at top Navy levels and faded by 1948. '^' 
Despite the optimism of Arnold, the Air 
Force blew hot and cold on rocket missiles 
and satellites. Analyses of satellites and 
boosters were conducted by Douglas-Rand in 
1945-46 for the Air Force and contracts (the 
MX series) were started for missiles in 
three ranges up to 8000 kilometers. By the 
end of 1946,however, international and 
national events resulted in the Air Force 
switching emphasis from rocket to air- 
breathing propulsion, and this was not re- 
versed until the early 1950s.
SIGNIFICANT ACTIVITIES
Among the R&D activities during the second 
half of the 1940s were three that were sig- 
nificant for their later impact on space 
transportation. One was the continued 
interest in rockets by Rand analysts after 
completing initial studies for the Air Force 
and during the period of emphasis on air- 
breathing propulsion. By 1949, when the Air 
Force again asked Rand to examine satellites, 
they had prepared an extensive report on the 
potentialities of rockets including long- 
range ballistic missiles, an important plan- 
ning step towards the intercontinental bal- 
listic missiles (ICBM) of the 1950s.
The second activity was experiments sponsor- 
ed by both the Air Force and Navy on liquid 
hydrogen-oxygen, conducted at Ohio State
University, Aerojet Corporation, and the Jet 
Propulsion Laboratory of the California 
 Institute ' ' of Technology. Although the
work was done with small rockets and not 
carried very far, the results indicated that 
high exhaust velocities could be attained, 
regenerative cooling with liquid hydrogen 
was possible, liquid hydrogen could be pump- 
ed, and the pump's ball bearings could run 
directly immersed in liquid hydrogen without
lubrication. This technology was shelved as 
attention turned to more conventional pro- 
pellants for missiles.
The third activity was vehicle tests by 
Convair to obtain better rocket structural 
data. Convair engineers, like others, were 
greatly hampered by the lack of structural 
data beyond the A-4. To fill this need, 
Karl Bossart proposed to build and fly ten 
test vehicles incorporating some ideas for 
reducing, structural or empty mass. The 
program began in 1947 but funding was soon 
cut and the number of vehicles reduced to 
three. These were flown at White Sands 
during the latter part of 1948. The ve- 
hicles contained three features: very light- 
weight tanks which were thin-walled and 
pressure stabilized, a concept proposed, by 
Oberth in the 1920s but independently con- 
ceived by Bossart; elimination of the insu- 
lation jacket for liquid oxygen to save 
weight; and use of swiveling nozzles* first 
used by Goddard, to control the pitch and. 
yaw of the vehicle. The flight tests were 
not an outstanding success but. none of the 
problems were caused by the three features, 
all of which were incorporated into the 
Atlas, the first U.S.ICBM.(6)
To sum up to 1950, there were a number of 
proposals for space flight but little 
acceptance. Rocket engine performance was 
relatively low with durability and reli- 
ability uncertain. Vehicle empty mass was 
still relatively high and many improvements 
were needed to increase range. More flight 
data were needed. In short, there was too 
little experience and confidence in rockets 
to create much serious interest in space 
flight. A stronger motivation was needed 
and it did not come until the first part of 
the 1950s.
MISSILE DEVELOPMENT .AND SPACE PROPOSALS
Samuel Hoffman, president of North American 
Aviation's Rocketdyne division that first
developed, large U.S. rocket engin.es., saw the 
first half of the 195Os as preparation for 
ballistic missiles and space travel., and the 
second half as development of ICBMs and the 
start of the space age* Gen. Bernard 
Schriever, who managed the Air Force's 
missile developments during the 1950s* saw 
'the decade as the golden age of advancing 
rocket technology **? *
The decade began with space enthusiasts
apparently no closer to their goal than
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before and with air-breathing propulsion 
favored over rockets for long-range mis- 
siles. Weapons development and scientif- 
ic interests, however, brought rapid 
changes by mid-decade. The military 
swung back to rocket missiles in 1953-54 
when a breakthrough in thermonuclear 
weapon development indicated that a much 
smaller payload than heretofore thought 
necessary about 700 kilograms would be 
effective for strategic use. In 1954 the 
Atlas ICBM was selected for intensive 
development and within a year there were 
two ICBMs and two intermediate range bal- 
listic missiles (IRBM) under development 
by the Air Force and Army. Funding jump- 
ed from $3 million in 1952-53 to $161 
million in 1954-55 and continued to rise.
The stepped-up military missile develop- 
ment spurred space enthusiasts also. A 
number of proposals and fascinating des- 
criptions of things to come appeared in 
technical meetings and the media. One of 
the most noteworthy was the series of 
articles in Colliers by von Braun and 
others in 1952-54 which was later publish- 
ed as a book*' 8 ' On the technical side 
were papers dealing with all aspects of 
space transportation including not only 
the vehicle with its propulsion, structure, 
and guidance systems but also the hazards 
man might experience in space such as 
high accelerations at take-off, weight- 
lessness, hard vacuum, meteorites, and 
radiation. Attention to the return phase 
of flight also increased; winged, rocket- 
powered vehicles were discussed indepen- 
dently by Nonweiler (1951), von Braun 
(1952-54), Ehricke (1952-54). Romick 
(1954), and Crocco (1954),^' Crocco en- 
titled his paper "The Crucial Problem in 
Astronautics:Recovery of Multistage Ve- 
hicles." He argued that economics dictat- 
ed that each stage be a complete flying 
machine capable of ascending into space 
and returning safely to earth. His pro- 
posal of a step-by-step increase in 
flight capability was reminiscent of 
Valier and Tsiolkovskiy. The problem in 
the mid-1950s, however, was that all the 
big money and priority and hence tech- 
nology were focused on expendable mil- 
itary missiles.
In the midst of all the mounting optimism 
and effort to gain political and public 
support for space flight, there were some 
with a different view. One was Jonathan 
Leonard, science editor of Time magazine, 
who ridiculed the prospects of space
flight by pointing out its many problems 
in an article in Life magazine:"Space, Its 
Enough to Make the Blood Boil."(Life, Aug. 
31. 1953). Among engineers who urged 
caution in making overly optimistic space 
proposals, was Milton Rosen, director of 
the Viking sounding rocket program, who 
knew the practical problems from first- 
hand experience. In several meetings, he 
spoke on the "margin of error," where he 
pointed out that small decreases in rocket 
propellant flow or thrust could make big 
differences between predicted and actual 
performance. In 1955, he and von Braun 
clashed puBlicly. The event was the second 
symposium on space flight at the Hayden 
Planetarium of the American Museum of 
Natural History where von Braun was sched- 
uled to present a step-by-step development 
approach and Rosen was to follow with a 
"down-to-earth" view. The coordinator, 
Willey Ley, wanted to drop Rosen's paper 
for fear that it would turn people away 
from space flight, but von Braun took the 
opposite view: a good argument would create 
interest. He was right, for the session 
made the front pages of New York news- J 
papers and the cover of Time magazine. (10)
HELP FROM SCIENTISTS
In 1953, space advocates got a big break 
when the use of satellites to study space 
phenomena was recommended by a group of 
scientists planning the International Geo- 
physical Year (IGY) activities to start in 
mid-1957. The idea of a satellite for 
scientific research gained government ac- 
ceptance and by mid-1955 both the Soviet 
Union and the United States announced plans 
for IGY satellites.
SPACE BECOMES AN ACCEPTABLE WORI)
The U.S. plans for a scientific satellite 
were limited to a very modest effort and 
included the development of a special 
launch vehicle the Vanguard. The vehicle 
development, managed by the Navy, was not 
to interfere in any way with the high 
priority military missile developments. In 
fact, during the following years, emphasis 
on missile development was so great that a 
general anti-space attitude developed among 
U.S. Government officials. Anyone pro- 
posing a government program that mentioned 
space was inviting a budget cut. A typical 
example of this attitude was Schriever's 
experience after a talk he gave at a rocket
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meeting in San Diego in February 1957 in 
which he mentioned that the missile pro- 
gram was creating a foundation for space. 
The following day he received a telegram 
from Secretary of Defense Charles Wilson 
ordering him never to use the word"space" 
again in any of his speeches. '^' This 
attitude changed overnight, of course, 
when Sputnik flew in October. By the time 
of Sputnik there were six U.S. missiles 
under development Jupiter, by the Army; 
Polaris, by the Navy; and Thor, Atlas, 
Titan, and Minuteman by the Air Force  
and all were larger and had greater pay- 
load capability than the U.S. satellite 
booster, Vanguard. Funding for the mis- 
siles was $1.3 billion in 1954-57 and was 
still climbing. President Eisenhower and 
the Department of Defense kept these mis- 
sile programs strictly on surface-to- 
surface military requirements, much to the 
disappointment of space enthusiasts.
FEASIBILITY OF THIN-WALL TANKS
The first Atlas flew in 1957 and the 
flight, generally regarded as a failure, 
was really a great success for demonstrat- 
ing the feasibility of Bossart 's thin-wall, 
pressure-stabilized tanks incorporated in 
the missile. During the first flight, the 
exhaust flames severed a control cable in 
the engine compartment causing the missile 
to tumble violently while still in the 
atmosphere. In spite of the very heavy 
aerodynamic loads imposed on the tanks 
and structure, they held  a convincing 
sight to many. Some engineers, however, 
remained unconvinced and prominent among 
them were members of von Braun's team at 
the Army Ballistic Missile Agency (ABMA) , 
who were as conservative in their designs 
as bold in space proposals. Later, when 
Atlas was selected for Mercury flights, 
the ABMA engineers kidded Bossart: "My 
God, John Glenn is going to ride in that 
contraption? He should be getting a medal 
just to sit on top of it before he takes 
off.* Once, during a visit of ABMA 
engineers to San Diego, Bossart and his 
associates decided to show them just how 
tough the Atlas skin was. They pressurized 
a rejected Atlas tank and invited their 
visitors to knock a hole in it with a 
sledge-hammer. One tried and the instant 
rebound of the hammer from the undamaged 
surface narrowly missed taking an ear 
* 'off. ' The ABMA engineers remained un- 
convinced about thin-wall, pressure- 
stabilized tanks and all of their designs,
including Saturn, reflected their belief 
in relatively heavy, massive structures. 
The light Bossart tanks, however, were a 
breakthrough in the problem of building 
light vehicle structures and played an 
important role later in gaining accept- 
ance for the use of low-density liquid 
hydrogen in upper stages.
LARGE ENGINES AND RELIABILITY
Although missiles received top priority, 
the Air Force far-sightedly supported 
R&D on larger engines, obviously with 
manned space flight in mind. In 1955, 
Rocketdyne received an Air Force contract 
on the feasibility of an engine of 1.3 
meganewtons (300,000 Ib thrust), the E-l, 
but it was never built. The same year, 
Rocketdyne announced that a single engine 
developing 4.5 meganewtons (1 million Ib 
thrust) was feasible. In 1956, a panel 
of the Air Force's Scientific Advisory 
Board recommended a study of engines of 
22 meganewtons, far larger than any 
currently planned. In 1958, the Air 
Force awarded Rocketdyne a contract for 
the preliminary design of a 4.5 mega- 
newton engine, designated the F-l. Later 
in the year, NASA took over the project, 
increased the desired thrust to 6.7 mega- 
newtons, and held another competition 
which Rocketdyne won. A development 
contract for the engine began in January 
1959.
During the development of the ICBM and 
other rocket engines during the 1950s, 
a recurring problem was a phenomenon
called combustion instability or com- 
bustion pressure oscillations. These 
oscillations greatly increased heat 
transfer and quickly burned out normally- 
cooled engines. A great amount of 
research was done on combustion oscil- 
lations but general understanding re- 
mained limited. The ICBM, engines over- 
came this problem and became reliable, 
but during F-l engine development in the 
early 1960s the problem rose again. It 
was eventually solved but combustion 
instability was generally regarded, as one 
of the biggest threats to reliability 
during engine development, and testing.
HIGH ENERGY PROPELIAMTg
The first and, major liquid prope 11 ant 
combination used in the IRBMs and ICBMs
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was jet fuel (kerosene)-liquid oxygen, 
and performance was reasonably high. 
During the 1950s, however, there was con- 
siderable interest in liquid propellants 
capable of producing higher performance, 
but none appeared suitable for military 
missiles where readiness and logistics 
were major factors. In 1950, researchers 
at the NACA Lewis laboratory chose liquid 
hydrogen as a promising high-energy fuel 
and planned to extend the technology of 
the 1940s, but research was hampered by 
the lack of an adequate liquid hydrogen 
supply. This problem was overcome by the 
mid-1950s and experiments were conducted 
on the regeneratively cooled engines of a 
practical size. The laboratory's asso- 
ciate director, Abe Silverstein, became 
enthusiastic about the potentiality of 
using liquid hydrogen for high-altitude 
aircraft as well as rockets. His famil- 
iarity with hydrogen from Lewis experi- 
ments with both rockets and aircraft was 
to play an important role in a key decision 
in late 1959, to be discussed later.
In a separate activity, Clarence Johnson, 
famed aircraft designer, completed his 
development of the U-2 and became inter- 
ested in the possibility of using liquid 
hydrogen in an advanced aircraft to sur- 
pass the U-2's altitude performance. He 
proposed this to the Air Force in early 
1956 and the Air Force became very inter- 
ested. A special project was established 
and over a hundred million dollars was 
spent over the next two years on various 
aspects of hydrogen fueled engines and 
aircraft, including financing the con- 
struction of three sizeable hydrogen 
liquefiers. Although liquid hydrogen 
proved to be reasonably easy to handle, 
Johnson became disillusioned over the air- 
craft 1 s range and logistic problems. The 
project faded in 1958 but its Air Force 
managers proposed to use the technology 
and facilities to develop a hydrogen- 
fueled rocket. This became the RL-10 
engine developed by Pratt & Whitney and was 
initiated in August 1958. Independent of 
the Air Force's hydrogen aircraft project, 
Krafft Ehricke proposed a hydrogen-oxygen 
upper stage for Atlas for space applica- 
tions. The proposal, made in late 1957, 
was not selected for development until 
August 1958. Powered by two RL-10 engines, 
the Centaur became the first upper stage 
to use liquid hydrogen-oxygen, the same 
combination advocated by Oberth in the 
1920so Like the Atlas, Centaur used 
Bossart's thin-wall, pressure-stabilized
tanks sharing a common bulkhead and it 
has been one of the most successful 
stages in the space program.
During development of the hydrogen-oxygen 
RL-10, combustion instability problems 
were not encountered. The principal 
engineer, Richard Mulready, independently 
conceived the idea of operating the 
hydrogen pump's ball bearings immersed in 
liquid hydrogen. This was the same 
concept shown to be feasible at Ohio State 
University a decade earlier, indicating 
once again that similar innovations spring 
from more than one source.
TURMOIL AND ORDER. 1958-59
The 1958-59 period was one of great space 
planning activity, competition among 
government groups for a role in space, 
and the emergence of the basic space 
transportation "stable" of boosters that 
has served the space program well. The 
Russian space accomplishments in 1957-58 
made it amply clear that their boosters 
had greater space payload capability 
than U.S. vehicles. There was a popular 
outcry in the United States, aided and 
abetted by space enthusiasts, to catch up 
and surpass the Russians. Thus, foreign 
competition, with attendant fears of 
losing technological and defense advan- 
tages, did what years of previous space . 
proposals had failed to do: gain political 
and public support for more than a 
minimal space program.
The low-budget, low-priority Vanguard 
program was plagued with development 
problems at the time of Sputnik, and in 
November the Army was given permission to 
prepare a back-up vehicle. The following 
month turned out to be a low point for 
U.S. space plans. After Sputnik, Vanguard 
received the full glare of U.S. public 
attention and the launch of its third 
test vehicle in December was a disaster. 
The von Braun team, who had been studying 
large launch vehicles since 1956, chose 
that month to submit an ambitious proposal 
to the Department of Defense entitled 
"A National Integrated Missile and Space 
Development Program" but it received 
little attention. Also in the same 
month, the Air Force made a move towards 
a space role by establishing a directorate 
of astronautics headed by Brig. Gen. 
Homer Boushey, but it was abolished three 
days later on curt orders from President
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Elsenhower, then in Paris. Boushey had 
the dubious honor of heading the shortest- 
lived office in the Air Force. ( l -
The U.S space picture brightened in early 
1958 with the successful launching of 
Explorer I and Vanguard I. In this atmos- 
phere of success, ABMA revised and re- 
submitted its proposal in March. It 
listed eleven space boosters ranging from 
the Vanguard and ABMA's Juno I to a 
second generation orbital carrier of two 
stages, both recoverable, with a payload 
of 23,000 kilograms. The report became 
enmeshed in a web of other space planning 
activities. In February, the Department 
of Defense established the Advanced 
Research Projects Agency (ARPA) as the 
focal point for all military space and 
other advanced projects. In its initial 
planning, ARPA included scientific satel- 
lites but in early April, this was changed 
by Presidental directive; the NACA was to 
become the nucleus of a new civilian space 
agency proposed to Congress the same month.
In an earlier bid for a space role, NACA 
organized a space technology planning 
committee headed by Dr. T. Guyford Stever. 
The committee organized seven working 
groups, on of which was on vehicles  
headed by von Braun. In April, von Braun's 
eager staff jumped the gun on the working 
group by submitting an "interim" report 
to the Stever committee that was essen- 
tially the same report, even to the title, 
as submitted earlier to the Department of 
Defense. In addition to the space vehicles, 
the report proposed an ambitious space 
program including a 50-man, permanent 
space station; flights to the moon; and 
interplanetary expeditions to Mars and 
Venus. When the report reached quiet, 
conservative NACA headquarters all hell 
broke loose and the report quickly acquir- 
ed a tag forbidding it to leave the 
premises. ABMA asked permission to dis- 
tribute the report but NACA gave permission 
only if each copy bore a disclaimer that 
it was not an official NACA document. Von 
Braun soon got his working group together, 
however, and it included members from NACA 
the military, and industry. Their final 
report, in July, contained a vehicle 
program of 15 boosters in 5 generations 
of development. The first three gener- 
ations were based on on-going missile 
developments. The fourth generation was 
ABMA's Juno V with four Rocketdyne E-l 
engines developing 6.8 meganewtons, with 
an alternate configuration of a cluster
of nine ICBM engines for the same total 
thrust. The fifth generation included 
larger vehicles 13 to 26 meganewtons, 
with high-energy chemical and nuclear 
upper stages. The same month, Silverstein, 
a member of the Stever committee and von 
Braun's working group, and head of NACA 
space activities, submitted a rather 
modest budget request for a start on the 
booster program. Included were funds for 
a large engine development, a cluster of 
existing engines, and work on high-energy 
chemical upper stages the latter for 
unmanned flight.
While NACA was planning a space program, 
ARPA had acquired an aggressive group of 
experts who moved quickly towards large 
boosters. One, Richard Canright, believed 
that a cluster of existing ICBM engines 
was the fastest way to build a large 
booster and further, that multiple engines 
would enhance reliability. Canright con- 
vinced the von Braun team of the value of 
this approach rather than their favorite 
design using four proposed E-l engines. 
In August 1958, ARPA directed the Army and 
ABMA to develop the first stage of a large 
booster using the multiple engines, first 
called Juno V and later Saturn I. Also in 
August, as previously mentioned, ARPA 
directed the Air Force to start development 
of a hydrogen-oxygen engine and the 
Centaur upper stage for Atlas.
In January 1959, NASA and the Department 
of Defense presented a joint report on a 
national space vehicle program to the 
National Aeronautice and Space Council and 
the President. In the report, the current 
vehicles Vanguard, Jupiter C, Juno II and 
Thor-Able were criticized as being 
hurriedly assembled under pressure, not 
very reliable, and not suitable for future 
space needs. A series of general purpose 
vehicles, with an estimated useful life of 
5 years, were described: Atlas-Vega, Atlas- 
Centaur, Juno V (Saturn I), and Nova. Two 
other vehicles were mentioned, the all- 
solid propellant Scout for small payloads 
and Atlas-Hustler fox military missions, 
In the months to come, NASA dropped Atlas- 
Vega in favor of Atlas-Centaur and the 
military replaced Atlas-Hustler with Atlas- 
Agena.
Juno V, DoD's large vehicle, was shown 
with two configurations in the report, 
differing only in the third stage. The 
initial third stage was to use kerosene- 
oxygen like the two lower stages but
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would be later replaced by a hydrogen- 
oxygen stage using' the Pratt & Whitney 
engines under development.
Nova was NASA's large vehicle concept 
which would use four F-l engines in its 
first stage and one in the second stage. 
The third and fourth stages would use 
hydrogen-oxygen engines. NASA saw Nova 
as a means for transporting man to the 
surface of the moon and returning him 
safely to earth.
One of the problems facing government 
planners was not so much a lack of ideas 
for space transportation but how to select 
the best, consistent with the overall objec- 
tives of the national space effort. In 
this respect, the rest of 1959 was a tur- 
bulent period for large booster proposals 
but the issues were resolved by the end 
of the year.
Events during the spring and summer of 
1959 were frustrating for military plan- 
ners of large space boosters. Work pro- 
ceeded at ABMA on the first stage of 
Saturn I, but a decision could not be 
reached on Saturn's upper stages, partic- 
ularly after the Army began to consider the 
Air Force's Titan as a second stage. The 
Air Force wanted no part of this, for not 
only would it divert some Martin effort 
away from the Titan missile, it would also 
bring the Army into its contractor territory. 
The Air Force offered to manage the develop- 
ment of a Titan as a second stage for 
Saturn but the Army wanted no part of that 
arrangement. Another pertubation was Air 
Force plans for a larger version of a 
Titan, called Titan C, which would boost a 
winged vehicle into a skip-glide path. This 
was Dynasoar, the first U.S. project initi- 
ated for a manned winged vehicle for even- 
tual flight into orbit and return.
While the intramural wrangling over Titan 
as a second stage for Saturn was going on, 
a much worse problem for Saturn arose. Dr. 
Herbert York, newly appointed to the Depart- 
ment of Defense's highest position in re- 
search and development, began taking a 
hard look at large boosters and military 
space plans. He believed that even after 
several years of effort the military had 
not made a case for manned space flight. 
He saw such flights as NASA's mission and 
ABMA's emphasis on large booster develop- 
ment as seriously interfering with the 
Army's primary mission of ground warfare.
He also questioned the need for Saturn in 
view of the Air Force's plans for Titan C. 
York was able to win Secretary of Defense 
Neil McElroy to his view and he sent ARPA 
a message that he was cancelling 
Saturn.^ ' ARPA tried to save Saturn by 
offering it to the Air Force but this did 
not succeed. The remaining alternative 
was to transfer Saturn to NASA which ABMA 
had successfully resisted for some time 
even though the transfer was favored by 
both the Secretary of Defense and the " 
President.
York's critical assessment of the military 
role in space forced an issue that had 
been simmering for some time: how many 
large space boosters could the Nation 
afford to develop? York established a 
review committee with himself and NASA's 
Hugh Dryden as co-chairmen to consider 
the three large boosters: the Army's 
Saturn, the Air Force's Titan C, and 
NASA's Nova. Agreement was quickly 
reached that only one should be developed 
and Saturn emerged as the winner. Titan 
C was shelved and Nova was considered too 
far in the future to be competitive with 
Saturn. York agreed and began negotiat- 
ing for the transfer of ABMA to NASA: in 
October, President Eisenhower approved 
the transfer by executive order.
Remaining unsettled after the selection 
of Saturn was its upper stage config- 
urations. ABMA abandoned its initial 
proposal to use Titan as the second stage 
when further study of the long, slender 
configuration indicated severe struc- 
tural bending load problems. A second 
stage with a larger tank diameter than 
Titan I but using Titan's engines was 
proposed. NASA favored using hydrogen- 
oxygen and pushed for the development of 
a 668 kilonewton hydrogen-oxygen engine 
that had been under study for some time. 
This engine, with a higher thrust spec- 
ified, was the J-2 and its development 
started in early 1960.
In December 1959, with the issue of 
Saturn's upper stages still unresolved, 
NASA's Richard Horner appointed a NASA- 
DoD "team" headed by Silverstein to make 
recommendations on Saturn upper stages 
and a Saturn development plan. Von Braun, 
a member of the team, initially argued 
strongly for using tried and proven 
kerosene-oxygen engines in the second 
stage. Silverstein, however, was con- 
vinced not only from his own experience
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and judgment but also by Saturn analyses 
by Eldon Hall that all upper stages 
should use liquid hydrogen-oxygen. This 
was a very bold view at the time, for the 
only project underway using hydrogen- 
oxygen was Centaur and it was in the early 
stages of development. Silverstein won 
von Braun and others on the team to his 
view and in mid-December the team recom- 
mended that the first and follow-on 
Saturns use liquid hydrogen-oxygen in all 
the upper stages.' ^' Also recommended was 
a "building block" approach for upper 
stages in which, for example, the second 
stage of the first Saturn could be used 
without modification as the third stage of 
a larger, follow-on Saturn. The follow-on 
Saturn turned out, after a number of con- 
figuration studies, to be Saturn V. Thus 
the basic decision of the Silverstein 
committee to use hydrogen-oxygen and the 
development approach of multiple use of 
stages were key factors in the timely 
development, performance, and reliability 
of Saturns I and V.
To sum up the 1950s, there were many 
imaginative descriptions of space missions 
and some realistic proposals. These 
raised sparks of interest but not suffi- 
cient flame to support a project until 
scientists provided the reason and moti- 
vation. The use of space for science 
brought political and public acceptance 
of a very modest space effort until 
foreign competition stimulated a large 
space program. Space transportation was 
able to get a rapid start by using 
missiles and technologies developed during 
the decade. Competition between government 
groups, coupled with political and public 
will, became the crucible for ensuring the 
emergence of a strong and sound program. 
Innovations, such as those by Bossart, and 
bold decisions, such as the one by 
Silverstein to use hydrogen-oxygen in all 
Saturn upper stages, allowed quantum jumps 
in technology and the development of suc- 
cessful vehicles.
In conclusion, the lessons of the 1950s 
can apply to future successful space 
projects. They need the right mix of: 
realistic proposals of what can be done 
and the benefits to be derived, in order 
to create enthusiasm and desire; timely 
and realistic plans in tune with political, 
economic, and social interests, to gain 
acceptance; research and technology, to 
make developments feasible, augmented by
innovations and bold, sound decisions if 
needed to overcome major obstacles; sound 
engineering and management, to develop 
and fly reliable space vehicles; and life 
support and protection systems to ensure 
that astronauts can fulfill their role 
during the mission.
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